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The substantial investment  in models of  international food markets
immediately prior to  and during the Uruguay Round of international trade
negotiations has been a mixed blessing so  far as  the prospects for reform are
concerned.  At worst, results  from these models have mislead the negotiations,
first because  they have served the  losers from reform better than  the gainers
and second, because they have tended not  to address a primary concern lending
domestic political support to  food market  interventions, namely the  avoidance of
risks borne of dependence  on international markets.  The paper reviews some
errors which have stemmed from the  application of  'standard' but  inappropriate
models  and examines  the  implications of extending  the standard methodology to
include dynamic behaviour and market insulating policies.
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Fax  (06)  249-5124.SEARCHING UNDER THE LIGHT:
THE NEGLECT OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, DYNAMICS AND RISK IN THE ANALYSIS OF FOOD
TRADE REFORMS
My title refers metaphorically to the  story about  the man who, having
dropped his keys  on a dark street, returns and chooses  to search  first beneath
the  street lights.  In many fields  of endeavour,  this approach  is  clearly
rational.  It  is efficient  to eliminate  the easy options before approaching the
difficult ones.  But the possibility remains that only the carriageway is
illuminated, and not the  sidewalk down which the man had travelled.  In this
case, the  'search under the  light' strategy  is  misleading and, ultimately,
inefficient.
It  is my fear that some analyses  of the domestic  and international effects
of agricultural policies, and of alternatives for  their reform, have been thus
misguided.  The models used to characterise market and government behaviour have
employed standard, rather than frontier, methodology, the  scope of which
seriously limits  the power of the models to  address the policy issues  at hand.
This  can be particularly problematic in  the area of economic policy since early
results from  'standard' models can mislead the processes of policy formation and
institution building.  The  resulting mistakes  can result in new policy regimes
and institutions the  lives  of which are not simply terminated when new research
suggests a change of direction.
Global models covering multiple  interacting commodity markets and
incorporating endogenous policy formation have recently become standard practice
in the analysis of agricultural trade policy, as  in Roningen  (1986) and OECD
(1987, 1990).  But  the improvements  they offer still  leave  important
deficiencies which, in my'view,  must be addressed before we have a truly useful
characterisation of global food markets.  First,  they ignore the  role of
intertemporal changes and uncertainty which are  critical to both policy
formation and the behaviour of private agents.  Second, the partial equilibrium2
assumption on which they are based fails because most  of the world's food is
produced and consumed in developing countries, where agriculture  is  the dominant
sector.  And third, they retain a high level of commodity aggregation,  assuming
homogeneity within any  individual market.
In this paper I illustrate  the ways  in which these  assumptions make  the
'standard' models misleading.  Part I briefly reviews  the  recent evolution of
models  for food trade policy analysis.  Part II  offers examples  of the ways in
which the failure of the  latter two  assumptions has  influenced the policy debate
during the Uruguay Round.  The main body of the paper addresses  the  first of the
assumptions,  that facilitating comparative static analysis.
The  failure to represent the  dynamics of food markets and of policy
regimes which affect  them is,  in my view, a critically important omission.  The
consequences of policy, as  measured in comparative static  terms,  are thereby
confused with  the motivation for policy formation.  The emphasis in early work
has been on questions  such as:  "Who benefits  from  the existing market
distortions, by how much and at whose expense?"  (see,  for example, Tyers and
Anderson 1988, Roningen and Dixit 1989).  Although political pressure exerted by
immediate beneficiaries -pight be influenced by this,  wider support for some
distortionary policies need not depend on static measures of economic surplus
gained and lost.  In my view the broad political agenda behind most
distortionary agricultural policies  is  insulation against  changes  abroad, rather
than an activistic redistribution of pre-existing domestic wealth, yet
insulation as  an aspect of agricultural policy has  thus  far been only weakly
addressed by research on agricultural trade.  Part III  of the paper examines the
reasons why governments choose  to  insulate their domestic  food markets while
Part  IV addresses some  consequences of making market insulation explicit  in
policy models.3
I
THE EVOLUTION OF FOOD TRADE MODELLING METHODOLOGY
Since the  commodity boom years of  the  1970s  there have been substantial.
investments  in research on food trade policy.  Interest  in the  subject has  since
been further enhanced by the onset of the Uruguay Round of international trade
negotiations and  the  important role assigned to  agricultural reform therein.
The bulk of the  policy analysis  thus  stimulated has employed readily available
and easily interpreted partial equilibrium analysis  in comparative static mode.
The early work of  this  type addressed  the effects of distortionary policies  in
single  countries and single  markets  for homogeneous  commodities, assuming  that
either the  quantity traded or  the border price  is  exogenous  (see Thompson 1981
for a review of  these and some more advanced approaches).
Later, still in comparative static mode,  new approaches  emphasised
international interactions, most popularly in non-spatial partial equilibrium
models of individual world commodity markets  (in the manner of Zwart and Meilke
1976,  Linnemann and others  1979, Valdes and Zeitz  1980 and Bale and Lutz  1981).
Interactions between separate commodity markets were  incorporated in some single
models which retained the comparative static approach and the partial
equilibrium assumption (that the totality of the markets represented is  small
compared with the economy as  a whole).  These included the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's GOL model  (Rojko and others  1978).
Even while all these partial equilibrium comparative  static models were
informing  the policy process, important deficiencies were recognised by some,
including that policy is  exogenous  in each case.  In such models, disturbances
transmitted internationally as  price changes are assumed to affect only the
behaviour of private  agents.  New models were built  to experiment with
endogenous policy formation, as  reviewed by Rausser et al.  1982 and, more
recently by Rausser and de Gorter 1989.4
Important deficiencies remain, however.  Models which are now standard
still  ignore  the role of intertemporal  changes and uncertainty, both of which
are  critical critical  to  food market behaviour and policy formation.  The
partial equilibrium assumption on which most are based fails because most of the
world's  food is  produced and consumed  in developing countries,  where agriculture
is  the dominant  sector.  And they tend to  retain a high level of commodity
aggregation, assuming homogeneity within individual markets.
This  is  not to  say that there  is  no work on models which address  these  and
other remaining problems.  The  first,  and in my view the most important,  is  the
subject  of a very large literature the  results from which have  thus  far  tended
not  to be used in models  directly influencing policy formation.  Early papers
examining the  effects of policy on price  stability include  those by Sampson and
Snape  (1980) and Blandford  (1983).  Our own efforts have crudely addressed food
market dynamics  (Tyers 1985, Anderson and Tyers 1990b and Tyers and Anderson
forthcoming),  while work proceeds  on more sophisticated representations  (which
simulate dynamic games)  none of which can be  expected to  generate useful results
in time  to  influence the current round of trade negotiations  (see,  for example,
Vanzetti and Kennedy 1988).
In another illustration of my opening metaphor, the availability of new
general equilibrium methodology has led a substantial effort  to address the
second problem, towards  the construction of global  general equilibrium models
which give emphasis to  agricultural commodity markets.  The methodology is
reviewed by Hertel  (1990) and examples of global models of this general  type are
those by Parikh and others  (1986)  and Burniaux and Waelbroeck  (1985).  As for
the  third direction, the use of CES subaggregators  in trade models  is  now
becoming commonplace and the means  is  therefore available to relax the
homogeneity assumptions  in the  larger agricultural trade models  (see, for
example, Brown 1987).  Such improvements  are, however, coming too  late to
directly  influence the process of policy formation in the current round of
negotiations.5
II
PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM AND HOMOGENEOUS COMMODITIES: AN ILLUSTRATION
One  comparatively subtle way in which the early partial equilibrium
results were misleading is  with respect  to  the  intersectoral and macroeconomic
effects of agricultural distortions.  In the  early 1980s Kym Anderson and I
focussed our research on the policies of the  industrial market economies, where
agricultural  sectors have  only small shares of national income  and employment
and where protection in  the agricultural sector,  at least  for the most part, is
more  extensive than that  in other sectors.  Provided these two  conditions are
met, partial equilibrium models, combined with simple welfare measures,  can
yield useful comparative static results.  But when the  analysis  is  extended to
cover other participants in  the Uruguay Round of negotiations  (the  developing
countries and some  of the centrally-planned countries) these conditions no
longer hold and the results  are misleading.  The perception that  developing
countries  as  a group would be net  losers  from any reform in  the  industrial
market economies  (as suggested, for  example,  in Tyers  1989) has not only
increased the  reticence of developing  countries  to support reforms  in  the OECD,
it  has also had institutional consequences  in that a formal negotiating alliance
has  developed between net-food-importing developing countries.  Yet a more
detailed examination which takes  account of intersectoral and macroeconomic
effects suggests that a clear majority of developing countries could benefit
from such reforms  (Anderson and Tyers  1990a).
But  the  story does not end there.  In both the earlier studies  all
products within each of.  seven commodity categories are considered perfect
substitutes,  irrespective of country of origin.  This assumption might be
appropriate  in grain markets where products are standardised if not  fully
homogeneous.  The markets for meat and dairy products are another story,
however.  Total liberalisation experiments  suggest  that,  in the  absence of6
current distortions,  industrial countries would be  substantial net  importers of
these  commodities from developing countries.  But it  is  difficult to conceive of
a liberalisation in  the  EC  or  the United States which would cause  those
countries  to  import  substantial quantities of dairy products from dairy
producing countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.  For  some time at
least,  such trade would be severely limited by sanitary restrictions.
To examine  the  implications  of this,  I recently applied our partial
equilibrium simulation model to  the  case  in which the dairy and meat products  of
the developing countries differ  from those  of  the  industrialised countries.  I
made  the extreme  assumption that producer prices  of livestock products in
developing countries would not rise  in  the event of a liberalisation in  the
OECD.  The results,  summarised in Table 1, show that a larger increase  in
international food prices would be needed to  satisfy expanded excess  demand in
liberalising countries because developing country livestock producers no longer
respond.  The  extent to which developing countries as  a group would be net
exporters  of food is  therefore substantially restrained.  The higher livestock
prices constitute a more seriously adverse terms  of trade change  than before and
very substantial net losses to the  developing countries as  a group,  such losses
as I doubt would be offset by the  general equilibrium effects of reforms in the
OECD.  Moreover, since the increases which would occur in international meat and
milk product prices are larger with this assumption, these  losses are borne
primarily by the food-importing countries of Africa and Asia.  Thus,  the early
result  from the  'standard' model may have been correct in this  instance, though
for the wrong reasons.  Such good fortune cannot be  relied upon in general.7
TABLE  1
Partial Equilibrium Analysis of OECD Liberalisation  in Year  2000 with and
without the Differentiation of Developing  country Livestock Products
Homogeneous  Different
products  products
Change in index of
international food prices,  Z  28  31
Food self-sufficiency,  X
OECD countries  88  92
Developing countries  105  101
Net change  in economic welfare
(1985 US $ billions)
OECD countries  53  49
Africa  -6  -8
Latin America  4  2
Asia  -6  -9
All developing countries  -8  -15
a  The  food  commodities  included  are  the  grains,  meats,  dairy products  and
sugar.
Source:  Simulations  using  the  trade  model  of  Tyers  and  Anderson
(forthcoming).8
III
EXPLAINING MARKET INSULATING POLICIES
As  foreshadowed in  the  introduction, it  is  my view that  the broad
political agenda behind most distortionary agricultural policies  is  insulation
against changes abroad, rather  than an activistic redistribution of pre-existing
domestic wealth.  If this is  true,  the  comparative static  results  fail to
address the  fundamental motivation for  the policy.  Since  it  is  unlikely that
reforms would be embarked upon simply in  the  interests  of such dispersed groups
as  consumers and  tax-payers,  the  results  have served to better  inform the  likely
losers from reform and hence to  galvanise the  forces against  it. 1 The  remainder
of  this Part addresses  the veracity of my premise.  Why should domestic market
insulation be a primary motivation for food market distortions.
In their discussion of direct foreign investment, under the subheading
"Instinctive Reactions", Lindert and Kindleberger  (1982) suggest  the following:
"Social man tends  to some considerable degree  to be a peasant with a
territorial instinct which leads him to object to  foreign ownership of national
natural resources;  a Populist, which makes him suspicious of banks;  a
mercantilist, which makes him favour exports over imports;  a xenophobe, which
leads him to  fear those  from outside  the  tribe;  a monopolist, who reacts
strongly against  competition;  and an infant, to  the  extent that he wants to eat
his cake and have it  too."
Should there be  any truth to this polemic,  it is  not difficult to  explain a
preference for the insulation of domestic markets against disturbances
originating in the rest of the world.  In practice, however, few countries
actually maintain self-sufficiency  in food.  Instead, world food markets tend to
be used as  sources of residual  supply or  as residual  dumping grounds.  But these
markets have the potential  to  do much more.  They offer global benefits from
specialisation and trade  and they spread the risks  associated with the
unpredictable disturbances.  Another of Kindleberger's  contributions has been to
classify efficient international markets  as public goods  (Kindleberger 1986).This  general idea has been further explored by Runge  et  al.  (1989) who  assert
that
"When countries retain the general benefits  of open trade while  attempting
to protect certain sectors  from competition, they are engaged in a form of 'free
riding',  drawing down the global benefits which trade provides".
In a similar vein, one can readily characterise  the  risk-spreading role of
world food markets as  an international public  good.  Its use  is not restricted
to  those  countries who share  risk by exposing  their domestic agents to price
fluctuations neither is  it  characterised by direct  rivalry.  Countries which
insulate  their domestic markets, using trade to  eliminate residual excess
demands or supplies and thereby stabilising domestic prices, might then be
portrayed as  free riders  even if their levels  of protection, averaged through
time,  are comparatively small.  By exposing  domestic agents  to  international
price instability, countries help  to spread risk and thereby contribute  to  the
supply of the international public good.  Typically, as  with all public goods,
the  inability to  exclude non-contributors leads  to undersupply and to
excessively risky world food markets.
But insulation need not be  directed solely at  short-run price
fluctuations.  Much of  the agricultural protection we observe and which has been
the  subject of extensive comparative static analysis  in recent years can be  seen
as  a consequence of market insulation.  As  illustrated  in Figure  1, real food
commodity prices have maintained a declining trend throughout this  century, one
which has  steepened since  the early 1970s  (Grilli and Yang 1988,  Tyers  and
Anderson forthcoming).  Simply by retarding the transmission of  this decline to
domestic markets, many governments have caused rates of protection to  rise
through time  to substantial  levels.  Others have  fully transmitted declines but
with a lag, leading  to continuous,  though lower, levels  of protection.  But in
each case the  objective served  is  the  conservation of some  initial  distribution
of domestic wealth and the  avoidance of the  risks associated with external
pressures  for domestic structural change.10
It  is my argument, then, that the  insulation of domestic markets is
perceived by most governments  to be  in  the national  interest  and that they
thereby exploit the risk-spreading capacity of world markets, collectively
enhancing international price risk.2  The literature supporting  the Uruguay
Round has  tended not  to  focus on the effects  of policy on international price
risk, nor on the reasons why governments choose to  avoid it.  It has  therefore
failed to  fully inform the negotiations as  to  the  collective risk benefits from
truly multilateral reform.  More  specifically, it  has not provided enough
quantitative evidence  that,  if  enough countries choose  to  insulate  less, better-
spread price  risk would reduce  the need for insulation by  others. 3 Progress in
reducing agricultural  trade barriers has  therefore been limited in this Round.
Resting as  the above argument  does on the premise that the  insulating
components  of domestic food policies are  indeed valued by governments for  their
own sake,  it  is  appropriate  that  the economics behind  the premise be explored
further.  It  is  sufficient  to establish either that  insulating policies yield a
net improvement in the aggregate welfare of all domestic  agents when border
prices are risky, or that insulating policies benefit those  groups with  the
greatest political influence and that governments therefore perceive political
benefits  from their implementation.  In one  sense  it  is surprising that such a
premise should be accurate.  Insulation is  distortionary,  creating efficiency
losses  in every year in which border prices depart from desired domestic levels.
To make insulation worthwhile, domestic agents  agents must be sufficiently
averse  to price risk to offset the efficiency losses.
In all countries some  agents can be expected to have stronger preferences
for price stability than others.  Since market insulation occurs  in both
developing and industrialised countries, we might hypothesise that this
preference  .would  be  strongest among the groups with most apparent influence over
agricultural policy in each case;  broadly, consumers  and industrial capital
owners  in developing countries  and farmers  in  industrial countries  (Anderson and11 Hayami).  What, then, are  the directions of the welfare impacts  of price
stabilisation on these  groups?
The  simple Marshallian analysis  of Waugh suggests  that,  in  the  dominant
case where the  source of the price fluctuations  is not shifts  in demand,
consumers  lose from the  stabilisation of the prices  they face.  This result
stems  simply from the downward-sloping nature  of demand curves.  A price  decline
increases welfare by more  than a price rise  of equivalent magnitude decreases
it.  Symmetrical  fluctuations  in price therefore  raise  average consumer welfare.
This  tendency of consumers  to prefer price  fluctuations  persists  in the more
comprehensive analyses of Turnovsky et  al.  and of Newbery and Stiglitz  (Chapter
9).  Their results suggest that consumers prefer price  stability only when they
are substantially averse  to  income  risk and when their demand  is relatively
inelastic.
To complement the  early Marshallian analysis  of Waugh, the  effects of
price stabilisation on producers were examined by Oi and Massell.  The principal
result of these  studies,  that producers  lose  from stabilisation where  the  source
of disturbances  is  not  the supply side  and gain from  it  otherwise,  does not
survive more comprehensive analyses  such as  those of Wright and Newbery and
Stiglitz  (Chapters 5, 6, 11).  These latter studies  take  account of some
important special characteristics  of primary  (and particularly crop) production,
including lags in supply response which necessitate  that production decisions be
made based on expected future prices.  The way in which these  expectations are
formed and the extent of farmer aversion to  risk are key determinants of
production behaviour and of farmer preferences  for price  stability.  When they
are taken into account, the  direction of these preferences  is  also ambiguous.
Other agents also have a stake  in price stabilisation.  In many poor
countries  industrial wages are effectively indexed, through payments in kind and
by other means,  to  the price of a key staple food, such as  rice.  Food price
fluctuations  therefore increase  the profit risk of  industrial capital owners and12
the  expenditure risk of governments as  employers.  But  governments and
parastatal agencies which monopolise imports  of particular commodities  can also
gain from reductions  in domestic price instability through partial insulation of
domestic markets.'  This  is  because, under certain conditions, the  revenue gained
when imports  are drawn from a  depressed international market and sold at higher
prices domestically exceeds  that lost when world prices are high and imports
must be resold at  a loss.
The ambiguous nature  of the consumer  and producer welfare effects  of price
stabilisation means that  the preferences  for price  stability of these
predominant groups  remain matters  for  empirical analysis.  It  is therefore
useful  to  examine these  effects  in some  illustrative  cases.  To do  so I  briefly
report the  results from an elementary model  of a single  open commodity market
which is detailed mathematically  in Tyers  and Anderson (forthcoming) and Gibbard
and Tyers.
The model might apply to  the market for a key food commodity such as rice.
It  assumes that the  focus  country is  a small  trader  in the  commodity and
therefore cannot influence  the level  of the  international price.4 That price
is,  however, subject to  random disturbances due  to  fluctuations  in demand and
supply  in the wider international market.  Domestic production of the commodity
is  also subject  to  random disturbances  such as might be caused by weather and
pest infestation.  Together, these  two  sources of randomness generate  the price
and  income risk from which the government seeks  to  insulate domestic agents.
To  illustrate the magnitudes  of the welfare effects of insulation consider
two  small archetype economies.  One is  a poor country which imports rice and the
other is an  industrial country which exports it.  In the poor country farmers
consume half the rice but earn only a  quarter of national  income.  Workers
consume the rest and receive wages which are  compensated for rice price
fluctuations.  They and industrial capital owners earn three quarters of thenational  income.  Household incomes  differ between farmers  and workers  and so,1
therefore, do their rice consumption parameters.  In the  industrial country, on
the other hand, farmers  consume only a small fraction of  their total output and
earn a small share of the  national income.  Their household incomes  are  similar
to  those of workers, however, and therefore  the parameters governing their
consumption behaviour are identical.
All agents  in both the developing and the  industrial country are  assumed
to be  averse to  risk, to  degrees  indexed by the  Arrow-Pratt coefficient of
relative risk aversion, R.  Developing country agents and farmers  in industrial
countries,  whose risks stemming from price fluctuations  are significant in
relation to  their net income,  are assigned a value of R - 2.  Food price risk is
less  significant for consumers and tax-payers  in industrial countries, however,
so they are assigned a value of R - 1.  In estimating the welfare  impacts of
changes  in price  stability for each group of agents  the approach of Newbery and
Stiglitz  is adopted, with only minor modification, as  detailed by Tyers  and
Anderson  (forthcoming).
The empirical  evidence summarised in Tyers and Anderson  (forthcoming)  and
Tyers  1990 suggests  that market insulation is  generally partial  in both
industrialised and developing countries  (the  degree of  insulation is  rarely 100
per cent, or  the elasticity of price transmission  is rarely zero).  The case
examined is  therefore that of a partial insulation which reduces  the  coefficient
of variation of the  domestic price by half (only half of any change  in the
international price  is  transmitted to  the domestic market).  As  the  results
presented in Table  2 demonstrate,  farmers are  comparatively indifferent  to
market insulation in the  developing country but could be  expected to  favour it
in  the  industrial  country.  This  is primarily because  farmers'  in developing14
TABLE  2
Benefits  from Partial  (50  per cent) Insulation  in  "Typical"
Developin2 and Industrial Economies
Benefits as  percent of average group
income or of government expenditure
Developing  Industrial
economy  economy
Farmers  0.2  4.0
Workers  -0.05  0.02
Industrial  Capital Owners  2.7  O.Oa
Government Revenue  0.6  0.0
a  Zero  since,  while  wages  in  the  developing  country  are  adjusted  for  food
price changes, they are not in the  industrial country.  Industrial profits
are  therefore not significantly affected by food price risks.
Source:  Calculations  based  on  parameters  drawn  broadly  from  World  Bank
(1986) and equations presented in Tyers and Anderson (forthcoming).15 countries commit  a relatively large share  of their income  to  the purchase of
farm products.  Their gain from revenue stabilisation is  largely offset by
losses which stem  from their relatively elastic consumer behaviour.  In the
industrial country on the  other hand, farmers  commit  little  of their income  to
farm products  and the  revenue  (and hence  income)  stabilisation effects are
dominant.
Non-agricultural  workers  in both  the developing and  the  industrial country
are  roughly indifferent to market insulation.  In the  developing country this is
because worker income  is  adjusted for  food price changes  through wage indexing
or partial payments  in kind.  In  the  industrial country it  is because demand is
inelastic and workers  spend only a small share  of their income on  food.  Food
market insulation is clearly favoured by industrial capital  owners  in developing
countries.  This  is because payments to  labour dominate  the value added in the
non-agricultural  sector.  Fluctuations  in these payments  therefore result in
substantial profit risk.  In industrial countries worker income  tends  not to be
compensated for short-term changes in food prices  and, in any case,  the non-
agricultural sector  is  less labour-intensive.
The  government revenue  effects are  dominated by  shifts  in mean revenue due
to  the  partial insulation policy.  These revenue  gains  depend primarily on the
elasticity of domestic consumer demand in the short run.  Since this elasticity
is comparatively high in  developing countries, the revenue effects  of partial
stabilisation are  significant there.16
In both cases  there  are net gains nationally from the  insulation,
supporting the public  interest explanation for insulating policies.  The  results
do, however, bear out the hypothesis  that the most influential  group has  the
most'to gain from market  insulation in each case.  The  gains  to  industrial
capital owners and to  government revenue are  dominant  in  the developing country,
where industry tends  to be protected at the  expense of agriculture  and where the
cost of collecting revenue by other means  is  especially high.  In the industrial
country on the  other hand, where agriculture tends  to  the protected at the
expense  of other sectors,  farmers have  the dominant  interest  in price
stabilisation.  In addition, since no  group of agents  in  the domestic  economy
would appear  to  lose  significantly, governments tend not to  find market-
insulating policies costly  to sell  to non-beneficiaries.
But there  is another  important reason for the prevalence of market
insulation.  It stems  from two  general characteristics of market-insulation
policies.  First, such policies always separate domestic from border prices and
hence distort domestic  incentives, at  least in the short run.  And second,
because  the current and future  trend of international market prices  is
uncertain, there  is no obvious and undisputed level at which domestic prices
should be  set in order to achieve the objective of comparatively stable domestic
prices.  The process by which the domestic price is  set is  therefore subject to
lobbying by vested interests.  The cost of substantial  distortion of domestic
prices  away from border prices  is reduced because governments  can claim that  the
distortion is  temporary, pending the  return of border prices  to  "trend"  levels.
Since the lobbying and propagandising effort of farmers  in industrial countries
is  stronger than that of groups which lose from high food prices,  this process
tends to be captured there by farm interests.  Similarly,  in developing
countries,  the  initially well-intentioned separation of domestic from
international markets by governments averse to  food price and wage risk reduces17
the political costs  of policies which ensure  that the  trend of domestic prices
is below that at the border.
Nevertheless, even where insulating policies  are not accompanied by
protection, it would be  improper to  leave  the  impression  that such policies  are
desirable  from the standpoint of world welfare.  They involve  the shedding of
risk through international food markets.  Although the analysis  in this  chapter
has emphasised the  small country case, the  insulation of food markets by large
numbers  of small countries must increase the  instability of international
prices.  When risk is  shed in this way by some countries,  it must be borne by
others.  The  cost of market  insulation policies  is  therefore  the burden of
foreigners,  the interest  group with the  least voice in  domestic politics.
IV
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF MARKET INSULATION FOR
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY ANALYSIS
The presence of market insulating policies makes more difficult  the
analysis of policy reform and its  interpretation.  Moreover, commonly used
comparative  static analysis  can be badly misleading.  To demonstrate  this,  I
examine  three key implications of market insulating behaviour.  These are  first,
that magnitudes of price  distortions vary from year  to year as  international
prices  fluctuate.  The  results  from any comparative static analysis  therefore
depend on which year is  chosen for analysis.  Second, when price distortions  are
measured in a single year, it  is  impossible to  tell what part of these  is  due,
on the one hand, to  governments' commitments  to keeping domestic prices  above
the trend of world prices  (pure protection) and, on the  other, to  risk-avoiding
market insulation.  And third, where policy analysis  is  carried out
prospectively,  the  results  can depend critically on whether international prices
are predicted to rise or fall.18
To  illustrate  these three  implications  for policy analysis, I draw once
again on the Tyers-Anderson model of world trade  in grains,  livestock products
and sugar.  This dynamic model is  equipped for  the purpose with endogenous
policy formation and stock-holding behaviour (Tyers and Anderson forthcoming).5
Its base period is  1980-82 which, by  inspection of Figure  1, has average
international food prices roughly on the  long run trend.  Simulations run from
1983  through the year 2000.  Disturbances  to  food production provide  the main
source  of uncertainty in  the model and these  are introduced stochastically
beyond 1987,  the  last year for which comprehensive  quantity and price data were
available at the  time  of writing.
The  analysis begins with a reference simulation which projects  the  trend
in mean food prices  illustrated in  Figure 2.  Since the  dramatic decline  in
prices of the  early 1980s  is  not followed by any substantial  resurgence,
protection rates in countries with insulating policies might be expected to be
higher than in  the base period.  Indeed they might be expected to  be at  their
highest in 1986 and 1987, thereafter declining as  the  dip in world prices is
gradually passed through to  domestic agents by those  countries which do not
insulate  their markets totally.  This expectation is borne out by the projected
trends  in protection rates  listed in Table 3.  Price distortions, and their
associated efficiency losses, peak in 1987  and their projected mean declines
thereafter.619
TABLE  3
The Effects of  Insulation on Changes  in Agricultural Protection Through Time
Average OECD  Global net
nominal  welfare  cost




1980-82a 1.40  16
1987b  1.96  83
1990b  1.81  45
1995 b 1.91  46
2000b 1.85  50
a  Base period estimates.
b  Reference simulation of the Tyers-Anderson model of world food markets.
c  The welfare measures used here are equivalent variations  in income.  They
ignore risk benefits.  Agents are assumed to be risk neutral.
Source:  Author's  estimates  and  model  simulations  more  fully  documented  in
Tyers  and Anderson (forthcoming).20
These results clearly illustrate  the  first of the above  implications of
insulating policies. Comparative static  analysis would yield conclusions about
price  distortions  and their economic  cost which would vary enormously, depending
on'the  year chosen.  In particular, studies based on statistics  for  1986 or 1987
would yield global efficiency losses twice as  large  as  for subsequent years  and
five  times larger than they were in 1980-82.  This  is a major difficulty with
studies  such as  that by Horridge and Pearce  (1988).  They address distortions
which appear high because  of the year chosen (1986) but which are mere  symptoms
of more  complex policies not  intended to distort prices  to  that extent in  all
years.  One way in which such studies have misguided the  negotiations process  is
that  they have made  it possible  for the  EC,  in  its mid-1990 proposal to  the
Uruguay Round, to  appear to offer a substantial reform by suggesting phased
reductions  in price distortions  of 30 per cent, with 1986  as  the base.  The
following  is a quote from that proposal.
"As foreseen by the decision in Geneva in April 1989,
reductions would be  measured against the  reference of 1986,  in order
to  give credit for the measures  which have been adopted since  the
Declaration at Punta del  Este."
To  the extent that international prices have risen since then, the insulating
policies of the EC have ensured that most of that reduction has already
occurred.  Such a proposal will yield true  reform only  if real  international
food prices  fall still lower  in the 1990s  than they did in 1986-87,  as Figure  1
suggests  they might.
To address the second implication, that  the effects of the pure protection
and the market insulating components of trade policy are difficult to  separate,
I have made an additional simulation in which the  insulating component of policy
is removed in all countries from the base period, 1980-82 onwards.  In our model
this  is  the equivalent of the conversion of all policies into ad-valorem taxes
or subsidies at  the border as  of 1982 and to  the binding of their rates in that
year.  Thereafter, while  the  level of pure protection is held constant, all21
proportional fluctuations in international prices are  fully transmitted to  all
domestic markets.  The  resulting counterfactual price projection is  illustrated
in Figure 3.
Not surprisingly, the  projected path of international prices  is  made more
smooth by the wider spreading of price risk.  This tendency is  even clearer  in
the  projections for individual commodity prices,  such as  that of wheat  (Figure
4).  More  importantly, however, the  decline  in prices beyond the base period is
substantially reduced.  This  is because, when domestic markets are not
insulated, the  increases  in ad valorem protection rates  in Table 3 no longer
occur.  The  differences between the retained protection rates of the base period
and those which occur when markets  are  insulated is  then that part of price
distortions due  to  the  insulating component of policies.  Obviously, this also
depends on which base period is  selected.  The period 1980-82  is sensible  in
that  its  average prices  lie on an estimated long run trend (Figure 1).  In Table
4  the  two components of policy are separated in this way and their global
efficiency losses compared.22
TABLE  4
Changes  in  Protection and Efficiency Losses Due to  Insulation since  1982
1987  1990  1995  2000
OECD nominal
protection coefficient
Reference  1.96  1.81  1.91  1.85
No  insulation  1.43  1.39  1.38  1.37
% of distortion due  to
insulation  55  51  58  56
Annual global net welfare
cost  of OECD protectiona
1985  US$  billions
Reference  83  45  46  50
No  insulation  20  18  13  12
X of cost due  to
insulation  76  60  72  76
Annual global net welfare
cost of protection in all
countries a, 1985 USS billions
Reference  111  77  82  94
No insulation  32  36  38  41
% of cost due to
insulation  71  53  54  56
a  The welfare measures used here are equivalent variations in income.  They
ignore risk benefits, assuming agents are risk neutral.
Source:  Model  simulations  more  fully  documented  in  Tyers  and  Anderson
(forthcoming).23
These results suggest that  the effects of insulation since 1982  are
substantial.  More than half of  the average price distortion  in the OECD  is due
to  insulation.  Note  that  the average  rate of protection varies slightly  from
year  to year even when there  is  no  insulation.  This  is  due  to changes  in the
volume mix of food commodities  in production and trade.  The efficiency losses
due  to insulation since  1982 are  also  the major part of the  net global cost of
price  distortions both  in the  OECD countries  and in all countries.  Had the GATT
Round concluded in 1982 with agreement to  cease market  insulation but  to retain
existing pure protection  (which held very high levels  in  some countries,
particularly in Europe and Japan) the majority of the distortions,  and of the
costs now being borne by the  world economy would not have arisen.  These are
good reasons why market-insulating policies  should have been given a higher
profile earlier  in the current Round.  They were not, at least in part, because
of a reliance  on 'standard' models.
Once a trade policy analyst decides, for  the above or other reasons,  to
incorporate  insulating policies  explicitly in their model, they must then
confront the third of the  implications listed above.  If they choose,  as I have,
to conduct  the  analysis of prospective policy alternatives prospectively, by
modifying a forward reference projection, then their results  will not be
independent of  the forecast content  of that reference projection.  It  is  not
possible to  use  the old  disclaimer that the  exercise of prospective policy
analysis is  not aimed at  forecasting and therefore  that projected price  levels
are of little significance.  If  the reference projection shows rising real
international prices,  insulating policies will  cause protection rates  to  decline
and,  liberalisation will yield comparatively small efficiency gains. 7 If, on
the other hand, they are..falling,  then projected protection rates will be
comparatively high as will  the efficiency gains from liberalisation.
To examine  the  sensitivity of model results  to projected price levels,  I
made two additional reference  simulations,  each retaining the  same  (constant)
policy parameters.  From 1989,  global income  grows one third faster than the24
original reference simulation in one and one  third slower in the other.  The
results, summarised in Table 5, have projected international prices in the  year
2000 departing from the  original reference by between 20  and 40 per  cent.
Insulation policies yield corresponding variation in protection rates which is
between 20  and 30 per cent.  Thus, projected distortions can vary considerably,
depending on  the analyst's  optimism or  pessimism about  future  trends in world
food prices.
To evaluate the  corresponding sensitivity of estimated efficiency gains
from reform, additional  runs were made simulating a ten-year  phased removal  of
agricultural distortions in only OECD countries over  the period 1991-2000.
These  runs were replicated to correspond with each of the  reference simulations.
The estimated efficiency gains  from liberalisation are listed in the  last row of
Table 5.  When projected international food prices are  lower by 20 percent, the
estimated net global gains  from reform are higher by 15 per cent.
One  important message in  the  foregoing is  as  follows.  Given the adaptive
nature of domestic policies affecting food trade, any truly useful analysis  of
one country's policies affecting food production and trade must take  into
account the extent to which the policies  of others will adapt in response.  The
appropriate model should therefore make  those policies endogenous.  Furthermore,
that model had better be more  than just a vehicle for comparative analysis;  its
performance will also depend importantly on its forecasting strength.
An example  of the practical importance  of the  latter point is  the  1980
United States  Farm Bill.  Policy was  formulated in  that year in a climate of
optimism about  future export markets  for staple  food products,  influenced in
part by the Carter Administration's  "Global 2000 Report".  No need was perceived
to address  the means by which farmers might be assisted  if international prices
collapsed.  Floor prices would continue to be  set at levels  it was expected
could be defended with additions  to public stocks.  When international prices25
TABLE  5
Dependency of Estimated Price and Welfare Effects of Reform on the Reference
Projection to 2000a
High  Medium  Low
Index of  international food
prices  (1980-82-100)  70  54  41
Average OECD nominal
protection coefficient  1.61  1.85  2.15
Annual global net welfare
gain from a phased total
liberalisation 1991-2000  35  40  46
a  The welfare measures used here are equivalent variations  in income.  They
ignore  risk benefits, assuming agents are risk neutral.
Source:  Model  simulations  more  fully  documented  in  Tyers  and  Anderson
(forthcoming).26
did indeed collapse, United States public cereal  stocks rose to  unprecedented
levels, effectively defending the floor price for  the world as  a whole.  From
the viewpoint of the United States,  this  was a particularly expensive approach
to  the assistance of its farmers,  one which was  subsequently changed following
the 1985  Farm Bill.27
V
CONCLUSION
Numerous models of domestic  and international  food markets have been used
in support of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations.  Almost all
these models adopt a comparative static approach and many also rely on  the
partial equilibrium assumption to simulate sectorally disconnected markets for
homogeneous commodities.  The omission from many of intersectoral effects  and
differentiated products, and from virtually all of dynamic behaviour and risk
has tended to misdirect those negotiations  and, at best, to  retard the process
of reform.  Applications of these models have examined price  and trade effects
of reform,  though emphasis has been given to  implicit transfers  among interest
groups and across  countries  in particular years.  The problem arises when these
calculations  omit  the effects  of distortions  in other sectors and, more
importantly, when such attention is  focussed on distortions  which are  temporary
and indirect consequences  of the  insulation of domestic markets  against external
disturbances.  Where market insulation is  the primary motivation there is
usually a broad base of political support  for the exclusion of shocks presumed
to  be  initiated by foreigners.  This issue might better have been addressed had
the research emphasised the risk-spreading capacity of  international food
markets  and the extent  to which the  reform of market  insulating policies  in all
countries could eliminate the  need for  it  in any.
It  is  of particular importance  that new models  for food trade policy
analysis  incorporate dynamic behaviour and price risk.  This will ensure that
they reflect a fundamental motivation for  food trade distortions and that they
are useful  in addressing the  collective mismanagement of the  global commons
suggested by unnecessarily risky markets.  Such models must necessarily be more
difficult to interpret, however.  The effects  of the pure protection and market-
insulating components of food policies are  then difficult  to  separate and the
implications for welfare difficult  to measure.  Furthermore, no  longer is  it28
appropriate for models to be  designed to specialise  in either policy analysis or
forecasting.  To  do the  former well  requires  that the  latter also be  done well.29
FOOTNOTES
This paper extends a lecture presented at  the Center for International Food
and Agricultural Policy, University of Minnesota, February 22  1990.  Thanks  are
due  to Ford Runge, Harald von Witzke and Jim Houk for useful comments and
suggestions.
1.  The way in which  the standard comparative  static analysis has helped to
galvanise  groups likely to  lose from trade liberalisation  is  suggested by
the  report on Roningen and Dixit by the Center for Rural Affairs  1990.
2.  Insulation by most countries has also  accelerated the  downward trend of
international food prices.
3.  I present quantitative evidence  in support  of this proposition in Tyers
1990a.
4.  Extensions  in the  paper by Gibbard and Tyers yield the  same general
pattern of results when countries are  large enough to  affect world prices.
5.  Although the model does  include endogenous policy formation and stock-
holding, it relies  on some  simple behavioural  assumptions, including that
all agents have backward-looking expectations.  Clearly, some agents in
industrial countries would be better characterised as  having model-
consistent expectations.  Methodologies  are now available which make this
possible, though none are yet in use  in global agricultural  trade models.
4.  Of course,  the projection beyond 1987  employs stochastic simulation.  The
mean projections therefore disguise an infinite number of alternative
combinations of projected prices,  rates of protection and efficiency
losses.
5.  This  is provided that most food production in the liberalising countries
is protected.  Of course,  if international prices are high and negative
protection  is most common, then insulation would yield larger price
distortions.30
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